Tsunami Warning-You Are Located in the Threat Area
By: Joe Francica
| (Nov 30, 2006) |
On October 15th of this year, a 6.7 magnitude
earthquake struck the Big Island of Hawaii about six miles north of the
Keahole-Kona Airport at 7:07 a.m. on a Sunday morning. Eight
minutes later, a second earthquake of magnitude 6.0 (the United States
Geologic Survey [USGS] has confirmed that it was an entirely separate
quake based on its location and depth) jolted the same area, its
epicenter located approximately 27 miles north of the first quake. Both
were considered "strong" earthquakes but no fatalities resulted from
either episode. Power outages affected the Big Island, Maui and Oahu. I
happened to be on the Big Island at the time, approximately 15 miles
from the epicenter of both quakes (refer to the map below), and I found
myself "in the dark" about what was going on and how much danger
I was in. Were these quakes on or offshore? How big were these quakes
and were they big enough to generate a tsunami? And if a tsunami was
possible, what evacuation routes should be taken? In short, I wanted to
know what was going on. I wanted to know what the local authorities
knew and where to turn for more information. Specifically, I wanted to
know if I was still in harm's way.

It's a reasonable request, given that we've spent billions of dollars
in the U.S. preparing for the next major terrorist attack, hurricane
and any other human or natural disaster. If what I encountered is any
indication, we are woefully unprepared to assist those affected for the
next one. Based on my experience and my subsequent research for this
report, the information I wanted was very much dependent on the
availability of the right geospatial data. Actually, the information
was readily available, but it had no way of reaching me.
This report is not meant to be an indictment of any federal, state or
local agency, but a first-hand account of what I observed, what I
learned subsequently, and what I know is possible to mitigate what I
believe to be a problem. As many of you will understand, the
technological feasibility of solving a problem is often well ahead of
other more difficult challenges. Despite the investments we have
supposedly made in disaster planning and response, I came away with no
clear understanding of who was in charge of informing the public and
how it would be done.
Let me begin with one specific observation: These quakes occurred very
early on a Sunday morning on an island in the Pacific that has a low
population density, not in a major metropolitan area in the middle of
rush hour. Consider the consequences of this occurring in San
Francisco. Consider also if the more recent, powerful 8.3 magnitude
earthquake off the Kuril Islands had affected Hawaii or the west cost
of the U.S. Not that these kinds of events haven't happened before,
such as in the Bay Area (the 1989 Loma
Prieta quake that
measured 6.9), but rather consider how government agencies have
supposedly been preparing to mitigate communication problems during a
disaster since 9/11 and more recently with hurricane Katrina. It
appears that still more needs to be done to communicate with those who
are actually experiencing the disaster as it occurs or others who may
be affected by its aftermath.
Background Information
I was on the Big Island of Hawaii for a vacation when the earthquakes
hit. When the first quake struck, I was outside in a garden area of my
hotel. I felt the initial shock wave that cascaded over the hotel roof
with a sound that was unlike anything I had ever heard and was coming
from all directions. Then the ground began to shake, which lasted for
about 20 seconds. It was a strong "shake" but I did not completely lose
my balance. When ground motion stopped, my immediate thoughts turned to
finding my wife. I ran back inside the building, but the power in our
hotel was out and stairwells were completely dark. My wife had been in
a glass-enclosed shower at the time where she was shaken violently and
did need to hold on to a bar to remain stable. The quake tossed lamps
and other items to the floor, knocked pictures off the wall and cracked
the dry wall in the room in several places. Fortunately, my wife
and I found each other 20 minutes later outside in a parking area. At
that point she said she had overheard someone talking about a tsunami
and that the best thing would be to get in our car and get to higher
ground. So, we sped from the hotel parking lot, passing other hotel
guests who were milling around, obviously uninformed and awaiting
further instruction . . . presuming someone HAD information and further
instructions! As we pulled away from the hotel, we turned on the radio
to find out what was going on, only to hear . . . music. Now here is
where
the story begins.
Information Flow Expectations
What I expected to hear was the Emergency Broadcast System. You know,
"In the event of a real emergency you would be instructed to tune to
"XXXX" station." Well a strong earthquake felt like a real emergency to
me and we never heard that broadcast, which is now known as the
Emergency Alert System (EAS). However, according to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), "The EAS is designed to provide the
President with a means to address the American people in the event of a
national emergency." Okay, this was not a national emergency, but
indeed it was a "local" emergency. So, who is supposed to communicate
the information? What agency is charged with informing the public about
a local emergency?
Driving north along the Queen Kaahumanu Highway from our hotel, we
encountered several road cuts where fallen rocks and some car-sized
boulders had been strewn across the road. [The photos below were taken
less than 1:45 hours after the quake.] Some authority needed to know
about the blockages we encountered and the danger they presented to
drivers, but who do you call? 911? Eventually, one radio station,
broadcasting from Honolulu and obviously not affected by the power
outage (or whose backup generators were operating when others were
not), did break in with news about the quakes. Mostly we learned about
power outages on Oahu and the Big Island, but that was it. Then, about
one hour after our departure from the hotel and while awaiting news in
Waimea (see map above; 20 miles from our hotel and at an elevation of
2500 feet above sea level), we heard from that same radio station that
no tsunami threat existed. I don't remember who the station said was
the source of this alert but my recollection is that the disc jockey
simply said "government sources." That was it. No official broadcast,
no government authority verifying the statement. We still felt in the
dark. If it wasn't for this single radio station, which truly did not
have any authority to relay an "official" announcement, we would have
been left wondering about the status of our situation. After some time,
we decided to trust the Oahu disc jockey and return to the hotel to see
what was going on.


I expected more, and as tax payers we deserve more. Was there going to
be a tsunami and if so, when would it occur? If an evacuation was
necessary, where should we go? What roads were open and what was
the travel time to a safe haven? The reports from the Oahu radio
station provided us with only the basics: The earthquake registered 6.6
(later upgraded to 6.7), and � eventually -no tsunami threat existed.
And this info only gradually trickled in to the radio station over
time; the station told us what they "heard" from local citizens calling
into the station but there was no "official" report. So, I began
to investigate the flow of information that I had expected to receive.
Where Does the Information Flow Start?
Seismic recording stations at the USGS's Hawaiian Volcanic Observatory
(HVO) on the Big Island captured the earthquake from its many recording
stations on the island. I spoke with Jim Kauahikaua of HVO who said
that the observatory's mission is to provide initial position and
magnitude information when earthquakes occur. They usually have a
position of the earthquake within five minutes of the event and will
send this information to local civil defense authorities. But HVO and
the USGS are not responsible for alerting the public, and merely
communicate the geospatial information to other agencies.
For the October 15th quake, the USGS determined that the second quake
at 7:14 a.m. was triggered by the first. Aftershocks generally occur
along the same rupture plane of the fault that caused the earthquake.
The location of the second earthquake on October 15th was 30 kilometers
north of the first and only half as deep at its rupture point within
the earth's crust. HVO does not operate 24/7, but earthquakes of this
magnitude brought geologists to the observatory within an hour of the
first event. Earthquake assessments this big are also referred to the
USGS's center in Golden, Colorado, because HVO primarily monitors
events associated with the island volcanoes which do not usually
produce earthquakes of this magnitude. In fact, HVO's recording
stations are tuned to measure quakes of a maximum magnitude of only
4.9. These quakes sent their seismographs off scale. HVO had originally
reported this quake at only 4.4. The information in the photo below was
posted at the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park on Oct. 16th and you can
see that the recording device truncates the data.

A more complete report from HVO about the earthquakes can be found on
their website.
An earthquake of this magnitude gets people's attention. The
information from HVO was immediately provided to the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Pacific Tsunami
Warning Center (PTWC) on Oahu and to local civil defense. PTWC may make
their own assessment and in this case they issued a bulletin four
minutes after the HVO report, with their own estimation of location and
magnitude.
I spoke to Chip McCreary, director of the PTWC, about his
responsibility for communicating the information. The PTWC continuously
monitors data across the state, mostly from the Big Island since that
is where the majority of seismic activity occurs. The PTWC coordinates
closely with HVO. Within 20 seconds of an earthquake, they have a
preliminary location, and alarm signals will notify the PTWC staff. In
the case of this earthquake, signals went off before it shook the PTWC
building on Oahu.
Some background information is necessary to explain NOAA's mission. In
general, NOAA will inform the public about severe weather and, in this
case, a tsunami. But some communication is a function of the local
agencies. Primary responsibility for informing the public about
emergency situations (weather, etc.) lies with civil defense (CD) which
controls the EAS. Multiple communication systems exist between the PTWC
and CD; phone lines are backed up with satellite and radio systems.
PTWC has a dedicated phone line supported by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). They also communicate via text bulletins
through normal weather channels, such as the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO),
an agency of the United Nations (worldwide); and Advanced
Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS), a National Weather
Service (NWS) program. Therefore, if an emergency existed, redundant
systems are in place to alert other public entities, but not the
general public. This seems to be a gross oversight given that the
surest way to reduce panic is to get the right information into the
hands of those people most affected by the situation.
The PTWC made a preliminary tsunami threat assessment of the situation
within three to four minutes of the October 15th earthquake and issued
a bulletin via NOAA weather radio. It also alerted local civil defense
authorities that this particular quake was not "tsunami-genic."
McCreary said that once or twice a month a magnitude four tremor or
above occurs on the Big Island and bulletins are regularly issued. In
the aftermath of the October 15th quake, McCreary talked with the
director of state civil defense to reassure him that no tsunami threat
was evident. No quake of this magnitude has occurred on the Big Island
for 13 years but McCreary said there is increased awareness of tsunami
potential due to the tsunami that hit Indonesia in December 2004.
Significantly, PTWC does not issue any bulletin if there will NOT be a
tsunami; only if a tsunami event is likely will they issue an alert. In
this case there was no warning because there was no threat. While this
method may be functional, it certainly does not meet the "need to know"
for the general public, who were caught in an information void on that
Sunday morning.
Sources for this report indicated that it was Hawaii County Civil
Defense (HCCD) that had the responsibility for informing the public. In
searching for information about what civil defense authorities advise
the public to do in the case of an emergency, the following information
is found on the Oahu
CD website: "A local earthquake, i.e.,
one that causes you to fall or hold on to something to keep from
falling, is a natural tsunami warning . . . (For) An Earthquake in
Hawaiian
Waters: If a significant earthquake occurs in the vicinity of the
Hawaiian Islands, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) will issue
an URGENT TSUNAMI WARNING for those islands which could be affected by
tsunami. The warning will be announced over radio through the Emergency
Broadcast System in conjunction with the sounding of Civil Defense
sirens. If an URGENT TSUNAMI WARNING specifically identifies Oahu,
leave all evacuation zones immediately." However, two of my sources
said that HCCD's system had a "glitch" due to the power outage. If HCCD
had tried to issue a warning, they would have been prevented from doing
so by an easily predictable power interruption. My calls to HCCD to
confirm this were not returned. In this case, this was a strong
earthquake, one which caused me to seek a hand hold. Therefore, by the
warning advice above, I might assume that a tsunami was imminent. It's
a gray area. Though no sirens sounded, was I to presume that everything
was okay? And with the power out, could I presume that the sirens would
sound anyway?
What We Should Expect and the Information We Should Receive
Let's start with the basics. The public should expect an emergency
status notification if they are located in the affected area. The
solution must work a majority of the time to inform the highest number
of citizens possible. That is perhaps the 70% solution guideline. In my
experience, everyone who remembered to pick up their cell phone as they
evacuated their rooms used it to call someone. With over 200 million
cell phones in use in the United States, there's a good chance you'll
be standing next to someone with a cell phone in case you left yours
behind, which is what happened to me. Most people that I saw were
getting through to make a call. We can not necessarily assume that all
cellular communications will be functional, but in this case backup
generators were functioning at the cell towers. Other solutions might
involve two-way pagers or satellite communications, but the majority of
the people today are carrying cell phones.
Consider this: As my wife and I pulled away from the hotel, we switched
on our Garmin i5 StreetPilot GPS-enabled personal navigation device
(PND). Garmin has introduced consumer PNDs integrated with cellular
communications, traffic alerts and XM Satellite services, thereby
giving consumers more access to better location-aware devices that are
more convenient, portable and more likely to be purchased than a NOAA
weather radio. These are the devices to which communications should be
sent concerning emergency evacuation routes and where to turn for more
information. And, as we have already seen with services offered by some
mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) such as Disney, the ability to
locate family members by "pinging" their cell phones and retrieving
their locations is already available.
More important, because these devices determine an exact location for
the user, emergency communications from civil defense authorities can
alert those who are danger within a specific geographic proximity that
they will, or will NOT, be in harm's way. That was one of the main
issues I had in investigating this event. It is technologically
feasible to have an alert sent to me at my specific location to tell me
if I am in danger. It is equally important to me to know that I am not
in danger.
In this case, NOAA/PTWC should have been able to communicate to those
in Hawaii County (i.e. the affected area) that the 6.7 magnitude quake
was NOT tsunami-genic. And, they should have been able to do it with
widely used communication tools. This would have alleviated many fears
for all concerned. According to PTWC, their algorithms are sufficiently
sophisticated to determine the area of a coastline that may expect a
tsunami if an earthquake of sufficient magnitude occurs. If so, then
the cell carriers who are now offering "geofencing" capabilities with
their phone service to locate family members should be communicating
with emergency authorities to provide similar alerts (via opt-in
request to address privacy concerns) to the affected people during any
type of emergency, local or national. It is not acceptable to be left
uninformed when the technology is readily available to notify citizens
in a very well-defined geographic region that they are in danger.
In addition, when NOAA sends alerts for flash floods, hurricanes or
tornadoes, it is usually a county-wide notification. This proves to be
overkill in most cases, especially when we are more technologically
equipped in terms of geospatial situational awareness. In short, if I
had a GPS-enabled device on which I received a text message alert
telling me that I am within ten miles of a tsunami, I would have the
information that I need to take action. And, if possible, that same
alert should tell me the most viable route to take to evacuate the area
because it should also be aware that some routes may be experiencing
high traffic flow or blockages. Today we already have adequate real
time traffic information services; in the future, a network of road
sensors may have even more information to deliver to citizens.
The WARN Act
This past September, the president of the United States signed into law
the WARN
Act which
originated in the Senate Commerce Committee. The WARN Act is supposed
to encourage communication protocols and standards in a manner
consistent with what I suggested above. It states, " The WARN Act will
establish a network for the transmission of alerts across a broad
variety of communication technologies, including wireless communication
devices such as cell phones and Blackberries, the internet, digital,
analog, cable, satellite television, and satellite and terrestrial
radio, as well as non-traditional media such as sirens and
�radios-on-a-stick.' The legislation would require that alerts provide
individuals with instructions about what to do in response to the
threat. The National Alert System, created under the WARN Act,
will ensure that regardless of where an individual is or what kind of
communication technologies they are using, they will receive a
life-saving alert. Alerts would be transmitted in response to all
threats to public safety, including natural disasters, man-made
accidents and terrorist incidents. Alerts would only be allowed for
hazards that pose a grave risk to public health and safety."
I contacted the Senate Commerce Committee concerning the implications
of this legislation. My source commented that the bill came up short of
its intended purpose. There are no deadlines to enforce the law or to
set these recommendations in motion in private industry. The Act was
supposed to push the telecommunications industry to come up with
standards. But essentially the legislation has no "teeth."
Summary
Though many millions of dollars in property were destroyed, the
Hawaiian earthquakes of October 15th caused no fatalities and the
disruption in power was merely an inconvenience for several hours for a
sparsely populated area. But it could have been a very different
situation, had the events occurred during a different time of day in a
more densely populated area. In my opinion, none of the solutions
to warn and inform the public would be difficult to implement. My
suggestions can be accomplished with technology available today.
However, it will require a number of agencies and telecommunications
companies to work together.
In the case of an earthquake or similar point source for an event, it
is likely that the geospatial data would be available to understand
location and magnitude such that the public residing in the affected
geographic region could be notified by some form of communication, and
one that may not depend on electrical power. Specifically in this case,
information should not be limited to the NOAA weather radio system. It
is not a ubiquitous form of communication, no matter how insistent NOAA
is that people should buy a weather radio. To be sure, it appears to be
a political problem whereby the necessary "teeth" are needed in the
WARN Act or other legislation to compel government and corporations to
work on solving this problem.
The WARN act emphasizes that "all" forms of communications be used to
inform the public. However, we should begin with the common sense
notion that a large majority of people are carrying cell phones and
that most of the phones, within five years, will contain location
determination chipsets such as GPS. Again in this specific case, had
this been a tsunami-genic event, NOAA would have issued an alert and
sirens would have sounded. However, as a tourist destination, how many
visitors would have understood that the sirens indicated that a tsunami
was imminent? So, there are also certain mitigating circumstances that
must be factored. These "gray areas" need to be addressed, but the
bottom line is that all available relevant information should be
relayed the public. Wandering around clueless in an emergency
situation is unacceptable.
Every organization that was mentioned above had some important piece of
the puzzle, but no single agency seemed to be able to coordinate the
information and use the available technology to communicate with the
public. And if they had the information, a question exists as to the
means they would use to communicate it most effectively. Cell phones
are one possible solution but perhaps not the only solution.
The next time I confront an emergency situation I hope to be informed
by an official source and in the shortest possible time. I'll gladly
opt-in to an emergency notification system that can determine my
location. We do that today with the 911 service that is already
mandated for cellular communications. And if I am incapacitated, I want
first responders to know my location as well. This is a geospatial
problem and we can solve it today.
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| A GPS-enabled GIS-based warning would be an ideal solution. It will also take some time and many dollars to implement (and what about those who cannot afford a cell phone?) In the meantime, NOAA does have the only operational warning system with national coverage (NOAA Weather Radio). Reliable power is a big issue; in the Nisqually earthquake in 2001 there was no reliable cell service in the Seattle-Olympia corridor, and everyone was trying to use it. I was on my cell phone when the quake hit, and my call was instantly severed (my first clue that an earthquake had hit the region). Schools and other public locations should be buying weather radios, and many FRS radios include those frequencies. THIS IS MY PERSONAL OPINION, and does not constitute a federal opinion or otherwise obligate the government. |
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| Thank you for writing an accurate, unemotional description of what occurred on October 15th. With a background in physical geography and working in the GIS industry, I should have instinctively headed for higher ground. But I was one of the clueless residents that stayed home assuming that if a tsunami was coming the civil defense sirens would have gone off. I was stunned by the complete lack of information available locally. I was also caught unprepared with no radio (needless to say our emergency kit has been updated). Between handing out batteries to the neighbors for their radio; sending my husband out to sit in the car to listen to the radio; and using the cell phone and corded phone to call family we were able to piece together what happened and what to expect. We got the majority of our information third hand from a relative on the mainland watching CNN. They say silence is golden. However, in this case it could have been deadly. I consider ourselves lucky that we got off as lightly as we did. Hopefully, this was a wake up call and the situation will be remedied quickly. Alexa Kailua, Oahu |
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| There are companies with existing location based warning/messaging technologies. Take a look at Cell@lert. See: http://www.cell-alert.co.uk/ and http://www.cellalert.com/index.html |
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| Joe, I read your article with great interest. Your observations are right on. Thank you for researching this cutting edge issue from your personal experience. You reminded me of the two "vignettes" that are included in the USGS Final Report on The National Map, witten about 5 years ago. These were written to help convey a vision for the future. You can find them on page 9 of the Final Report, located at: http://nationalmap.usgs.gov/report/national_map_report_final.pdf Early in 2002, inspired by the events of 9/11/01, I modified the second vignette for an internal USGS planning discussion. I renamed it Vignette 2A and submit it for your consideration. I think you will see why I think it is relevant to your article. One thing that should be noted: I use the term "reverse 911" in a generic sense, for the technology used to broadcast warnings to cell phones. I checked today, and it appears to be a trademarked term by a particular company. Vignette 2A: Common Action Enabled Through a Common Set of Basic Spatial Data MIDWAY, July 4, 2010 – After years of cleanup efforts, the river was open to swimmers. On a hot, muggy Fourth of July, people were drawn to the river–swimming, tubing, boating, and fishing. They had no idea of how exciting their vacations were about to become. Upriver, a contaminant had been dumped in the river in an act of terrorism, and the toxin was already moving downstream. An observant neighbor had noticed a stranger dumping something in the river, and promptly called 911. The dispatcher called an emergency spill center that had been set up in his state under a grant from the Department of Homeland Security. Their first priority was public safety and health. Using The National Map, developed and maintained by USGS and its partners, they plotted the site location on recent digital orthoimagery, along with thematic overlays of river and lake data, and flow direction and drainage information extracted from topography. Working from the location where the toxin entered the river, they used web-enabled models to identify the area and facilities downstream that the spill was most likely to affect. Water utilities with intakes in the area were ordered to stop pumping. Media were advised to broadcast warnings to stay clear of the contaminated water; however, officials were concerned that people on the river might not receive the warning in time. Following a predefined protocol called “reverse 911”, they sent an alert to all personal electronic devices that were “GPS-enabled”. Using The National Map and their computer models to outline an area that included the river and land within a proximity of shore, they identified all the devices in the area and sent them a simple message – “HAZARDOUS SPILL – LEAVE THE RIVER NOW.” People headed for shore as the river came alive with the chirping of cell phones, pagers, and personal digital assistants. The center also warned Federal and State natural resource and environmental agencies of the spill. By this time, personnel on site with a wireless, web-enabled PDA had identified the toxin and GIS models were communicating with The National Map to query the database and calculate rates of dilution and dispersion. All these agencies, with partners from industry and non-governmental organizations, had been linking information about water quantity and quality, the shape and makeup of the riverbed, and aquatic plants and animals, to The National Map for years. The agencies routinely used these spatially referenced data to plan actions to minimize damage and start clean-up operations. Other agencies used the database for routine management of the natural resources. “At least it won’t get much worse,” said one chemist after using the data to determine that the toxin was unlikely to make it into urban water supplies. Using The National Map, scientists pinpointed wetlands and alerted field personnel to place barriers to protect this productive habitat. Having issued the warning, the center concentrated on predicting the likely problems that would need to be dealt with. By analyzing real-time river flow information, elevation and land cover data, and weather forecasts, they estimated the rate of the spread, and produced maps showing impacted areas and access routes for remediation teams. “How about that,” one official exclaimed, “We might get ahead of this before it reaches the Mississippi.” |
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